This recurring section presents powerful “nuggets of frontier science wisdom” from leading researchers about their recent work. We are delighted this time to talk with philosopher Dr. Michael Sudduth about his studies of the survival hypothesis.
Sudduth is well-qualified to speak on the topic given his background teaching and publishing in the areas of critical thinking and epistemology, with a focus on theories of evidence and the justification of belief across different domains of inquiry, including general and legal epistemology (e.g., Sudduth’s entry on “Defeaters in Epistemology” in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/), topics in the philosophy of religion (Sudduth 2009/2016), and more recently postmortem survival (Sudduth, 2016).
Here, he answers questions that stem, in large part, from his recent JSE treatise (Sudduth, 2024) on reasoning and evidence with the survival hypothesis. Enjoy!
References
Sudduth, M. (2009). The reformed objection to natural theology. Ashgate. [2016 softcover: Routledge].
Sudduth, M. (2016). A philosophical critique of empirical arguments for postmortem survival. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137440945
Sudduth, M. (2024). The Augustine-Braude Bigelow survival debate: A postmortem and prospects for future directions. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 38, 468-531. https://doi.org/10.31275/20243309
1. "What inspired you to pursue this particular research question, and do you have any interesting stories from your research journey?"
I’ve been fascinated by questions about human nature, personhood, and consciousness for much of my life. This interest began with paranormal experiences in my childhood and teens, which sparked my curiosity about phenomena that challenge conventional understandings of reality. These questions became more pressing during the past two-and-a-half decades when I lived in a historic home where I and others witnessed haunting and poltergeist phenomena. These experiences led me to survival research, which has been a central focus of my work and publications for the past twenty years.
One formative experience occurred when I was seven or eight years old. Late one night, I felt compelled to walk into the hallway outside my room. As I stared into the dimly lit living room, I began to see the faint outlines of people seated on the furniture—friends and family members who had passed away. The experience was not frightening but comforting, leaving me with a profound sense of connection and curiosity about unseen aspects of reality. It made me wonder whether there are real phenomena that remain hidden under ordinary conditions.
Another pivotal moment came over two decades ago while living in a historic house in Windsor, Connecticut. My wife and I experienced a series of unexplained occurrences, including disembodied voices, moving objects, and electrical disturbances. After moving out, I received 'missed calls' from the house on my cell phone, even though the phone service had been disconnected. Research into the home’s history revealed a tragic story of a suicide and a fatal accident, which added depth to my understanding of these phenomena.
These experiences illustrate how first-hand encounters can ignite and sustain scientific curiosity. They continue to inform my research into the nature of consciousness and its potential survival beyond death.
2. "What have been the most significant findings of your study, and how do they contribute to the current understanding of this issue?"
As a philosopher, my primary focus has been on the conceptual foundations of survival arguments—the assumptions they rely on and the logic that supports them. One of my key findings has been the role of the 'comparative expectedness' of the data given the survival hypotheses and its alternatives. Generally stated, this criterion helps us assess which hypothesis better explains the data. For example, if a survival hypothesis (H1) better predicts an observation (O) than an alternative hypothesis (H2), then O supports H1 over H2.
This concept highlights a significant challenge for survival arguments: the reliance on auxiliary assumptions. Survival hypotheses alone rarely predict much; they require additional assumptions. These include assumptions about the continuity of postmortem consciousness with its antemortem states, the epistemic access discarnate persons would have to embodied persons and the physical world, the kind or degree of their causal powers, and a number of other assumptions required to explain away recalcitrant facts, such as discarnate persons having what are otherwise surprising lapses in memory, their indulging in twaddle, and exhibiting behaviors inconsistent with their antemortem personality.
One problem is that these assumptions are largely untestable or otherwise unjustified. Trying to confirm a hypothesis by enlisting assumptions as controversial as the hypothesis you’re trying to confirm results in a spurious confirmation. Not only is there no independent support for most of these assumptions, upon closer inspection it appears that the only reason to adopt them, as opposed to other survival-friendly assumptions, is that doing so results in a particular fit between survival and the data. But this is indistinguishable from rigging a theory to fit data we have collected in advance. For this reason, the survival theory – hypothesis plus auxiliaries – which survivalists have in mind is excessively permissive; it can accommodation any fact. But a theory that can accommodate anything ultimately explains nothing. Finally, survivalists are hoist by their own petard. Many of the reasons survivalists typically invoke to rule out non-survival explanations apply equally to a bulked-up discarnate survival hypothesis. Moreover, even if the assumptions had epistemic credentials of some sort, the same would be true of many alternative assumptions that would boost the explanatory power of alternative hypotheses, including alternative survival hypotheses.
These findings emphasize the need for rigorous conceptual clarity and identifying weaknesses in the logic of survival arguments. They challenge researchers to develop more robust frameworks for evaluating evidence and to avoid relying on assumptions that lack independent support.
3. "What was the most surprising or unexpected finding in your research, and how did it change your perspective on the topic?"
One of the most surprising findings in my research came while investigating the James Leininger reincarnation case. This case, often hailed as compelling evidence for reincarnation, quickly unraveled under scrutiny. I discovered that many of the claims attributed to James were based on information he was exposed to through ordinary sources, such as a Blue Angels video and visits to a World War II themed flight museum. Despite this, the Leiningers confidently denied that James had any such exposure, illustrating how easily critical facts can be overlooked or dismissed.
This case highlighted several broader issues in reincarnation research. First, researchers often underestimate the role of ordinary information sources and coincidence in shaping seemingly extraordinary claims. Second, the investigative process is prone to errors, such as relying on inconsistent witness testimony or failing to account for alternative explanations. Finally, advocates of such cases frequently lack clear criteria for evaluating evidence, making it difficult for them to address counterarguments effectively.
This experience made me far more skeptical about spontaneous cases of reincarnation. It underscored the need for rigorous investigative methods and a more critical approach to analyzing evidence. Ultimately, it reinforced the importance of epistemological clarity in ensuring that such cases are evaluated fairly and accurately.
4. "What future research directions do you believe are necessary to further explore and understand this controversial issue?"
To advance research into survival and anomalous phenomena, several improvements are necessary:
A. Rigorous Investigative Methods:
- Researchers must thoroughly investigate all potential sources of ordinary information. For example, if a child claims knowledge of historical events, investigators should examine any videos, books, or locations the child may have been exposed to.
- Investigations should prioritize contemporaneous documentation rather than relying on reconstructed accounts years later.
- Witness testimony must be critically evaluated, especially when it involves interpretations rather than direct observations, and specifically when witnesses try to give assurance that no ordinary sources of information could have played a role.
B. Conceptual Clarity:
- Researchers need to frame their findings as arguments rather than narratives. This requires articulating clear hypotheses and using established criteria for evidential support.
- Greater attention must be paid to epistemology and confirmation theory to avoid common fallacies or the reliance on inappropriate criteria of evidential support.
By adopting these practices, researchers can build a more robust foundation for exploring survival-related phenomena. Rigorous methods and clear reasoning will not only strengthen the case for survival but also ensure that the field earns greater credibility and legitimacy.
5. "How do you respond to the general criticism that many anomalous phenomena cannot be scientifically tested or definitively validated?"
Criticism that anomalous phenomena cannot be scientifically tested or definitively validated often stems from a misunderstanding of what scientific inquiry entails. Scientific testing does not require 'definitive validation,' which implies immunity to revision. Instead, it focuses on questions like: What does the evidence suggest? How strongly does it support a hypothesis? Is this the best explanation of the data?
The scientific testability of anomalous phenomena depends on whether hypotheses have observable consequences. Exact numerical values are not needed here, but our hypothesis must be contentful enough to tell us what we should expect to observe if our hypothesis true and what we would expect to observe if it is false or some other hypothesis is true. For example, if a survival hypothesis predicts that a discarnate consciousness can provide specific information unknown to the living, this can be tested by comparing the hypothesis's predictions to observed data. However, such hypotheses often rely on auxiliary assumptions—e.g., about the nature of discarnate consciousness and how it interacts with the physical world—that are not independently testable. This weakens their scientific credibility.
So, I’d say that there are two genuine problems for testing hypotheses concerning anomalous phenomena. First, hypotheses or theories must be sufficiently contentful to have empirical consequences. Second, to the extent that hypotheses must be joined to auxiliary assumptions, these assumptions must be independently testable. There are, of course, different accounts of independent testability, and I have discussed these elsewhere. But the general idea should be clear enough, as well as why it is the potential Achille’s heel of this domain of inquiry.
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